A key claim of current theoretical analyses of the memory impairments associated with amnesia is that certain distinct forms of learning and memory are spared. A compelling example is that amnesic patients and controls are indistinguishable in repetition priming but amnesic patients are impaired at recognizing the study items. The authors show that this pattern of results is predicted by a single-system connectionist model of learning in which amnesia is simulated by a reduced learning rate. They also demonstrate that the model can reproduce the converse pattern in which priming but not recognition is impaired if the input is assumed to be additionally degraded in a priming test. The authors conclude that dissociations between priming and recognition do not require functionally or neurally distinct memory systems.
According to an influential view, memory is not a unitary faculty but is composed of multiple systems that work independently of each other (Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 1994) . The most prominent distinction that has been proposed is between declarative and nondeclarative memory. Declarative (or explicit) memory is usually characterized by the conscious and intentional recollection of knowledge. Typical tests of declarative memory involve recall or recognition of previously studied stimuli. Nondeclarative (or implicit) memory, by contrast, is thought to influence behavior in the absence of conscious recollection. This type of memory is often measured indirectly, for instance on skill-learning tasks. A typical measure of nondeclarative memory is repetition priming, which is defined as an improvement in identifying, detecting, or producing a stimulus resulting from its prior presentation.
The most compelling evidence in support of the distinction between the two memory systems is that tests of declarative and nondeclarative memory functionally dissociate in amnesic patients (e.g., Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Hamann & Squire, 1997a , 1997b . These patients are impaired on recall and recognition but often perform normally when memory is measured indirectly. For instance, amnesic patients appear to show a normal increase of performance on skill-learning tasks such as speeded reading of nonwords , the resolving of random-dot stereograms (Benzing & Squire, 1989) , mirror reading (Cohen & Squire, 1980) , and the serial-reaction task (Reber & Squire, 1998) . Moreover, amnesic patients can perform normally on implicit categorization tasks (Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1993 and often also exhibit normal repetition priming (Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin, 1990; Graf et al., 1984; Haist, Musen, & Squire, 1991; Hamann & Squire, 1997a , 1997b Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970) . Two patients with lesions of the occipital lobe, by contrast, were shown to exhibit the reverse pattern of results, namely normal recognition with no or little priming (Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, & Morrell, 1995; Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, Johnson, & Corkin, 1995) .
A straightforward conclusion from these results seems to be that recall and recognition reflect a memory system that is distinct from the one(s) mediating performance on indirect memory tests. The aim of the present study is to reassess this conclusion from neuropsychological studies. By means of simulation methodology, we intend to demonstrate that even findings that seem to provide the most compelling evidence for a multiple-systems view of memory may be reconciled with a single-system view. In the first simulation study, we simulated data from a study by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) in which amnesic patients exhibited normal priming but impaired recognition of the same stimuli. The second study deals with the finding that there are usually very low correlations between priming and recognition, which is also interpreted as evidence for them being mediated by different memory systems. The aim of the third study is to ask whether the singlesystem view also accounts for the finding that some patients with occipital lobe lesions show a priming deficit but no recognition deficit.
Before presenting our model and the simulations, we give a short overview of evidence for distinct memory processes to put the present work in context. Subsequently, we describe studies with amnesic patients testing recognition and implicit categorization and consider how single-system models can deal with the results. Thereafter, we resume the issue of intact priming and impaired recognition in amnesic patients, which seems to be a particularly strong case for a multiple-systems view of memory.
Brief Overview of Evidence for Multiple Learning and
Memory Systems
The present work, which reassesses the conclusions that have been drawn from neuropsychological studies, is part of a much broader body of work seeking to determine whether multiple learning and memory systems are needed to understand human performance. Proposed distinctions, which are in many respects overlapping, include the implicit-explicit, procedural-declarative (Squire, 1994) , and recollection-familiarity (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) distinctions.
There now exist a large number of methods that have been proposed as ways of demonstrating the necessity of multiple processes in memory: These include the process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) and remember-know procedures (Rajaram, 1993; Yonelinas, 2001) , the analysis of receiver operating characteristics (ROCs; Yonelinas, 2001) , studies of implicit learning (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998) , and the comparison of task performance on matched direct and indirect tests (e.g., Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1993) , each of which comes with its own analytical techniques. However, critics have challenged the key assumptions on which these methods rely and have questioned the significance of the major findings.
In the process dissociation procedure, participants are typically required to recall studied information under either inclusion or exclusion conditions (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994) . Consider a recognition memory experiment in which participants study two lists (List 1 and List 2). In the inclusion condition, they are instructed to respond positively to List 1 words and negatively to List 2 and new words. In the exclusion condition, they are asked to respond negatively to List 1 words and new words and positively to List 2 words. Thus, participants try to respond "yes" to List 1 words in the inclusion condition and "no" to words from List 1 in the exclusion condition. The rationale is that in the inclusion condition both unconscious familiarity and conscious recollection contribute to the probability of a "yes" response whereas in the exclusion condition these processes operate in opposition: Recollection pulls the participant toward a "no" response, whereas familiarity pulls toward a "yes" response. The process dissociation procedure provides an algebraic method for estimating the contributions of these processes.
There is much evidence from the process dissociation procedure in support of multiple learning systems, and these processes have been related to distinct underlying neural structures (Aggleton & Brown, 1999) . However, a number of researchers have sought to reinterpret data from the process dissociation procedure from a single-system perspective (Ratcliff, McKoon, & Van Zandt, 1995; Yu & Bellezza, 2000) . For instance, Ratcliff et al. (1995) used a single-system model to generate a set of data and then applied the process dissociation procedure to those data. The method indicated, incorrectly, that the data derived from two separable processes. As Ratcliff et al. pointed out, the main problem with this technique is that it assumes separate processes and then provides a method for estimating the influence of these process but it does not provide any method for validating the original assumption.
Another method is the use of "remember" and "know" responses. Tulving (1985) suggested that true recollective experience in a memory test can be indexed by autonoetic consciousness in which the episodic aspects of the study event are consciously reexperienced. Tulving also proposed that familiarity is associated with noetic consciousness (i.e., knowing), whereby the person knows that an item was studied but does not reexperience any specific information about the study event. The remember-know procedure simply asks participants to introspect on their memory experiences. Consistent with the multiple-systems view, numerous variables have been found to affect the proportions of remember and know responses independently (e.g., Rajaram, 1993) . However, as with the process dissociation procedure, it has been questioned whether the data require multiple systems. For example, signal-detection models in which a single underlying memory variable is incorporated have been quite successful at reproducing the main findings from experiments using the remember-know procedure (Xu & Bellezza, 2001) . In these models, the participant is assumed to have one response criterion for saying "know" and a stricter one for saying "remember."
Analyses of ROCs in recognition memory provide yet another source of evidence concerning the possibility of multiple memory systems. These curves plot hit rates against false-alarm rates at different confidence levels in a memory experiment. If memory is controlled by a single system such as described by signal-detection theory, then ROC curves should comprise a regular family of functions. Yonelinas (1994) , however, has suggested that if memory is controlled by independent recollection and familiarity processes, then a different family of curves would be expected. Although there is evidence consistent with the latter account, it has also been empirically challenged . Glanzer and his colleagues showed that the dual-process model predicts a degree of curvature in zROC curves (ROC curves plotted in z space) that is significantly different from that observed, and they proposed as an alternative a single-process signal-detection model that assumes unequal variances in the familiarity values of old and new items. Moreover, it has yet to be determined whether ROC analyses can distinguish a single familiarity process from a dual familiarityplus-recollection account if the distributions of familiarity values for old and new items are nonnormally distributed.
A fourth body of evidence comes from numerous studies on implicit learning. These have sought to demonstrate the existence of a learning system that operates independently of awareness and intention to learn. As an illustration, many studies have asked whether Pavlovian conditioning can take place in humans independently of contingency awareness, that is, knowledge of the relationship between a conditioned stimulus and an unconditioned stimulus. In one such study, Clark and Squire (1998) found that participants who could not report the relationship in eyeblink conditioning nonetheless acquired conditioned responding. Of all these research fields, however, this is the most controversial. Although there are numerous apparent examples of implicit learning, adequate tests of awareness are notoriously difficult to find. In a reanalysis of Clark and Squire's data, for instance, Lovibond and Shanks (2002) found that participants classified by Clark and Squire as unaware were aware by another, arguably more neutral, measure of awareness (see also Manns, Clark, & Squire, 2002; Wiens & Ö hman, 2002) . Numerous other implicit-learning studies have also been subjected to methodological criticism (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 1994) .
In summary, then, the evidence from these analytic methods in support of the multiple memory systems viewpoint is very much in dispute. Against this backdrop, dissociations of explicit and implicit memory tasks found in patients with brain lesions stand out as exceptionally important pieces of evidence in favor of the viewpoint. As we argue below, this is particularly true for dissociations between repetition priming and recognition.
Dissociations Between Recognition and Implicit Categorization in Amnesia
Much support for the multiple memory-systems view comes from studies investigating recognition and implicit categorization in amnesic patients: Although amnesic patients are impaired on recognition tests, they often perform normally on implicit categorization tasks (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994 . However, Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) and Kinder and Shanks (2001) challenged the conclusion drawn from these studies by showing that single-system models can readily account for these results (see Palmeri & Flanery, 2002 , for a review). Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) demonstrated that the generalized context model (GCM) reproduces a dissociation observed by Knowlton and Squire (1993) . In this study, dot patterns were presented that were generated from a prototype by using the classic statistical distortion methods of Posner and Keele (1968) . Amnesic patients performed normally when they were asked to classify random-dot patterns, whereas their performance on recognizing the same type of stimuli was significantly impaired. According to the GCM, there is only a single memory system in which representations of entire training stimuli are stored. In Nosofsky and Zaki's modeling approach, a single parameter of the GCM, the sensitivity parameter, was varied to account for a general difference in memory efficiency between the two groups of participants. Nosofsky and Zaki showed that decreasing the value of this parameter had almost no effect on classification performance but considerably reduced recognition performance. Thus, the GCM successfully accounted for the dissociation between classification and recognition observed by Knowlton and Squire. By showing that a single-system model can explain this dissociation, Nosofsky and Zaki made it clear that a dual-system interpretation is not compelled by the data.
A similar demonstration using a completely different type of model was made by Kinder and Shanks (2001) . We reassessed studies reported by Knowlton et al. (1992) and Squire (1994, 1996) that investigated artificial grammar learning in amnesic patients. In artificial grammar learning experiments, strings of symbols (usually consonant letter strings) are presented that were generated using an artificial or finite-state grammar. Typically, participants first memorize a subset of all strings that can be generated by a particular artificial grammar. Then, they are asked to classify new grammatical strings, which they did not see during training, and new nongrammatical strings. In the experiments by Knowlton et al. (1992) and Knowlton and Squire (1994) , classification performance in amnesic patients was similar to that in controls. In contrast, two experiments reported by the same authors showed amnesic patients to be significantly impaired in old-new recognition, both of whole training strings (Knowlton et al., 1992) and of fragments of those strings (Knowlton & Squire, 1996 , Experiment 2). Thus, results of these experiments are consistent with those obtained in other tasks in supporting the notion of two distinct memory systems. Kinder and Shanks (2001) performed simulations of these classification and recognition tasks using a connectionist model, the simple recurrent network (SRN) model. When this network is trained on the same letter strings as participants in an artificial grammar learning experiment, it becomes capable of discriminating between new grammatical and new nongrammatical strings. The model has been shown to account for a variety of experimental findings obtained in artificial grammar learning (for an overview, see Kinder & Shanks, 2001) . Like Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) , we assumed in our simulations that a single memory system mediates both recognition and classification of the letter strings. Furthermore, we assumed that amnesic patients have a general memory deficit rather than a selective deficit of declarative memory. Consequently, we simulated amnesia by reducing a single parameter, the learning rate, both in recognition and classification. As is described in more detail below, this parameter resembles learning efficiency in the model. We demonstrated that reducing the learning rate reduced recognition performance considerably whereas it left classification performance almost unaffected. Thus, the model produced the very same pattern of results that was observed by Knowlton and colleagues (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994 , 1996 without assuming different memory systems.
In summary, both Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) and Kinder and Shanks (2001) showed that a dissociation between an implicit categorization test and a recognition test can be explained without assuming that distinct memory systems mediate performance on the two tasks. However, does a single-system account also hold for other functional dissociations than those between classification and recognition? In the following section, we deal with another dissociation, perhaps the most prominent in the literature, that between repetition priming and recognition in amnesia.
Dissociations of Recognition and Repetition Priming in Amnesia
As noted above, in a number of studies, amnesic patients showed impaired recognition performance while exhibiting normal repetition priming (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970) . Repetition priming is usually measured either by means of a perceptual identification procedure or on a word-stem completion task. During word-stem completion, participants are given stems of words they have studied before and stems of new words, and they are asked to complete these with the first word that comes to mind. Priming is demonstrated if the percentage of correctly completed old words is greater than the percentage of correctly completed new words.
Recently, this task has been criticized on methodological grounds: It was shown to have low reliability compared with a matched recognition task (Buchner & Wippich, 2000) . Therefore, there is a lower probability of obtaining a priming difference between different groups of participants, for instance between a group of amnesic patients and a control group, than of finding differences in recognition performance. Thus, preserved priming in amnesia could simply be a result of the low reliability of the priming measure. However, as Buchner and Wippich (2000) showed, this explanation does not hold for priming occurring on a perceptual identification procedure. On this task, words that have been studied previously and new words are presented extremely briefly, and the participants' task is simply to identify them. Priming is demonstrated if the percentage of studied words identified correctly is greater than the percentage of unstudied words identified correctly. In Buchner and Wippich's study, this priming measure had a reliability equal to that of a recognition memory measure. Thus, amnesic patients' preserved priming in perceptual identification (Gabrieli et al., 1990; Graf et al., 1984; Haist et al., 1991; Hamann & Squire, 1997a , 1997b Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, & McNealy, 1995; Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970) cannot be attributed to a methodological artifact and consequently represents probably the strongest evidence currently available supporting the declarative-nondeclarative distinction. In this article, we therefore focus on priming in the perceptual identification procedure rather than on other types of priming. We show that this dissociation is consistent with a single-system account. Although our results focus on a single piece of evidence in what is a voluminous literature supporting the multiple-systems framework, we believe their implications are profound (a) because the data we simulate are representative of a large number of published studies; (b) because these studies, for the reasons given above, stand out as particularly compelling; and (c) because, as indicated previously, many of the other components of the case for the multiple-systems view are controversial.
Repetition priming with words is often explained by the assumption that during study, preexisting word representations acquire a higher level of activation (Bowers, 2000) . A similar explanation also holds for priming with pseudowords because these have the same components as words and therefore could activate representations on a sublexical level (e.g., Dorfman, 1994) . On that view, priming does not require building new representations or associations but is merely a by-product of word processing. Intact priming in amnesia could then reflect a spared activation mechanism within the word-processing systems rather than an intact nondeclarative memory system. However, the activation hypothesis does not hold when priming occurs with novel consonant strings (e.g., RDP) because unlike pseudowords these strings do not contain valid sublexical components. Thus, functional dissociations found with this type of stimuli are a particularly strong case for distinct memory systems.
Two studies with amnesic patients using consonant strings as stimulus materials have been reported, one by Hamann and Squire (1997b) and another by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . Hamann and Squire performed three experiments in which amnesic patients showed impaired performance when recognizing four-letter consonant strings they had seen before. However, when identifying the same strings in a perceptual identification procedure, they exhibited normal levels of priming. Kinder and Shanks (2001) investigated by means of simulation methodology whether this pattern of results provides unambiguous evidence for a spared nondeclarative memory system. We trained the SRN model on the same stimuli that Hamann and Squire presented to their participants. We assumed that there is only a single memory system mediating both priming and recognition. To simulate priming, we presented the stimuli in degraded form so as to account for the very brief presentation times in the perceptual identification procedure.
By using this procedure, we found that the percentage of priming predicted by the model was constant across a wide range of learning rates. Recognition performance, by contrast, increased considerably within the same range of learning rates. Thus, on the assumption that a low learning rate resembles the amnesic patients' poor learning abilities whereas a high learning rate reflects the controls' good learning abilities, the single-system model reproduced the dissociation reported by Hamann and Squire. Kinder and Shanks' (2001) simulation results made it clear that a dual-system interpretation is not necessary to explain the dissociation found by Hamann and Squire (1997b) . Thus, for the sake of scientific parsimony, a single-system interpretation should be maintained. However, Hamann and Squire's study is not the best example for demonstrating that a single-system model can produce a dissociation between priming and recognition. This is because in Hamann and Squire's experiments, priming and recognition memory were measured using different item formats. In the perceptual identification test that was used to measure priming, only a single item was presented on each trial. By contrast, two items were presented on every recognition trial in a two-alternative forcedchoice procedure. Because different types of information were given on the two tasks, it is difficult to compare them and thus to interpret the functional dissociation between them. In the simulations of these experiments a further problem arises: Different equations have to be used to transform the output of the model into a response probability, and parameter values in different response functions are chosen independently of each other. This adds an additional degree of freedom when simulating the two tasks, which might facilitate reproducing a dissociation.
As noted before, Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) also used consonant letter strings for investigating repetition priming and recognition. In this study, a single stimulus was presented on each trial in both the priming and recognition tests. First, amnesic patients and controls were presented with three-letter consonant strings (e.g., RDP, HRW, or SMN) to study. Then, recognition performance was measured by presenting the participants with strings that had been studied before and strings that were new. Participants were asked to indicate for every string whether it was old or new. After participants had studied a second list of consonant strings, priming was measured by presenting studied and unstudied items very briefly. After each presentation, the participants were asked to report the string they had just seen. Priming was defined as the percentage of correctly identified studied items minus the percentage of correctly identified unstudied items. The results of the experiment were clear-cut: Amnesic patients were significantly impaired on recognition, but they exhibited a normal level of priming (see Figure 1) .
In this article, we present simulations of the perceptual identification and recognition tests used by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . Their study is an ideal example of a functional dissociation between priming and recognition because the relevant tests were designed to be as similar as possible: In both of them, a single item was presented on each trial. The aim of these simulations was to investigate whether a single-system connectionist model, the SRN model, can reproduce the dissociation between these two tasks. In the simulations, we assume that an identically structured system mediates both recognition performance and priming. We further assume that amnesia is characterized by a general learning deficit rather than a selective deficit of declarative memory. If the model can simulate the experimental data, then this would have considerable implications for the understanding of the functional and neural organization of memory as it would remove one of the central planks of the multiplesystems framework, namely the assumption that the dissociation between explicit and implicit memory in amnesia is evidence for separate declarative and nondeclarative memory systems. In the following sections, we describe the model and the psychological meaning of its parameters and then describe its performance in a series of three simulation studies.
The SRN Model
The SRN model can be depicted as a multilayered network that learns by error backpropagation. It is designed to learn sequences of stimuli by being trained always to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. Its architecture (see Figure 2) consists of an input layer in which the current stimulus is coded, a hidden layer in which an internal representation is generated, and an output layer in which the model's prediction is represented. The special feature of the model is the context layer, which contains a copy of the hidden layer's activation pattern on the last time slice. Because of this feature, the network is capable of predicting an element in a sequence not only from its immediate predecessor but also from several previous elements (Cleeremans, 1993; Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Elman, 1990) .
When simulating the memorization of consonant letter strings, the SRN is trained with the same stimuli as the participants are (e.g., Dienes, Altmann, & Gao, 1999; Kinder, 2000; Kinder & Shanks, 2001) . Each of the input units locally represents either one consonant or the beginnings or endings of the letter strings. The output layer contains the same number of units also representing all consonants and the beginnings and endings of the strings. Each string is presented letter by letter from left to right. A letter (or the beginning or ending of a letter string) is coded by setting the unit representing it to an activation of .9 while setting all other units to an activation of .1. On the presentation of each letter, the network's goal is to predict the next letter in the string. Before a new string is presented, activation values of all copy layer units are set to .5.
Recognition and Priming in the SRN Model
As a result of training, the model has a higher accuracy when predicting the letters of old strings than it has when predicting the letters of new strings. The accuracy of prediction is used to compute both the recognition and the priming measure. For computing prediction accuracy with one particular string, first, all the output vectors that represent the letters predicted by the network are concatenated. The length of the resulting vector corresponds to the length of a single output vector times the length of the test string plus 1 (because the end of the string is also predicted). The target vectors, which represent the correct predictions, are also concatenated. As a measure of prediction accuracy, the cosine of the angle between the global output vector and the global target vector is computed.
When recognition is simulated, prediction accuracy is transformed into the probability of an "old" response, p(o), for each test string (endorsement rate). This is accomplished by means of the logistic function, which is given below. After computing the endorsement rates for all old items (hits) and all new items (false alarms), a recognition performance score can be computed. In the simulations presented in this article, we computed the dЈ measure that was used by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) .
For predicting identification rates, we confined ourselves to simulating the impact of memory on perceptual identification rather than simulating the perceptual process itself. That way we were able to keep the simulations as simple and as similar to the recognition simulations as possible: We used the same version of the SRN model and the same response rule as in recognition. Thus, we again applied the logistic function to transform the cosine measure of prediction accuracy into a response probability-this time into the probability of a correct identification, p(ci). The logistic function is as follows:
where a and b are parameters whose impact and meaning is explained below. Priming was then defined as the mean identification probability across all studied items minus the mean identification probability across all unstudied items. Note that there is a fairly straightforward transformation between priming and recog- The only difference between the two tests in our simulations was that we accommodated the fact that the stimulus presentation times during perceptual identification were very short. In accord with the framework of cascaded processing (McClelland, 1979) , we assumed that short presentation times result in preasymptotic activation values in the input units. Therefore, activation values of the input units were set to values of .7 (instead of .9) for the presence of a letter and .3 (instead of .1) for its absence. It is essential to degrade not only the .9 activation values but also the .1 ones for the following reason: When a stimulus is presented very briefly in an experiment, such that participants can hardly identify its letters, they still know that a three-letter consonant string was presented. Thus, they are unsure not only which letters the string comprises but also which letters it does not comprise. Therefore, both types of information have to be attenuated when brief presentation times are simulated in the network.
Parameters of the SRN and Their Psychological Meaning
There are two different sets of parameters in the SRN, one of which affects learning and the other of which solely influences test performance. Parameters affecting learning are (a) the learning rate parameter, (b) the momentum term, (c) the number of learning epochs, and (d) the number of hidden units. Both the learning rate and the momentum term enter directly into the backpropagation algorithm (see, e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) .
These parameters have to be varied to simulate any experimental variation concerning the training stage (such as the type of training procedure). They also should be allowed to vary when performance of groups differing in age, intelligence, or, as in the present case, in memory impairment is simulated. Although these parameters are not completely redundant, varying them has a rather similar effect on performance. McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) as well as Kinder and Shanks (2001) varied the learning rate to simulate normal memory in controls and memory impairment in amnesia. The learning rate affects the magnitude of the weight changes on each training trial. Thus, it is related to the efficiency of the learning process.
In contrast to the parameters described above, the parameters in Equation 1 exclusively affect performance at test. It has been noted previously that Equation 1 is used to predict the probability of an old response in the recognition test ( p(o)) and to predict the probability of a correct identification in the priming test ( p(ci)). Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities for cosine values between 0 and 1 using different values of a and b. The figure makes it clear that a affects the slope of the function: With higher values of a, the function is steeper, and thus p(o) and p(ci) values are closer to 0 and 1. As a result, the difference between probability values for old items and new items tends to increase. Thus, both recognition performance improves and the priming effect gets larger. In terms of signal-detection theory, a affects sensitivity in the model. The parameter b, by contrast, affects the bias or criterion of the model. As can be seen in Figure 3 , increasing b results in lower probabilities for all cosine values. Thus, predicted probabilities both for old and for new items decrease as b increases.
Simulation Study 1: Recognition and Priming in Amnesia
In the simulations presented in the following paragraphs, we trained the network on the same stimuli that Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) presented to their participants. Keane et al. used four different lists of 24 three-letter consonant strings. Across participants, lists were counterbalanced such that the items of each list were presented equally often as studied and unstudied items in the perceptual identification procedure and as studied and unstudied items in the recognition test. In the simulations, we counterbalanced the test lists in the same way.
We systematically varied the learning rate from 0 (which means that there was no training at all) to .6 to investigate the impact that different levels of learning efficiency in the network have on performance on the two tasks (for the other parameter values, see the Appendix). We assumed that a high learning rate resembles normal memory in controls whereas a low learning rate resembles the memory impairment in amnesia. With each learning rate, we performed 100 simulations in each of which we used a different set of random starting weights. After training, both a recognition score (dЈ) and a priming score were computed for every network by means of the logistic function (see Equation 1) using the same values for a and b in both tasks. Thus, all parameters in the simulations of the two tasks were the same. The only difference between the two tasks in our simulations was that stimuli were presented in degraded form (.7/.3) for the priming condition and in undegraded form (.9/.1) for recognition.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the mean dЈ recognition score predicted by the model as a function of the learning rate. Each data point represents an average across 100 simulations. Unsurprisingly, dЈ is 0 when the learning rate is 0 -the network cannot discriminate between old and new items when it has not been trained on the old ones. As the learning rate increases, dЈ also increases until it reaches an asymptote at a learning rate of about .5. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the mean priming score (percentage of correctly identified studied items minus percentage of correctly identified unstudied items) as a function of the learning rate. As in recognition, priming is 0 when the learning rate is 0. As the learning rate increases, the priming score initially also increases. However, at a learning rate of .3, the maximum priming score is reached and with learning rates higher than this, there is even a slight decrease.
If we now compare priming and recognition at a high learning rate (.60) 1 with priming and recognition at a low learning rate (.15), we observe a considerable difference between the two recognition scores (see Figure 5 , left panel) but no difference between the two priming scores (see Figure 5 , right panel). This is exactly the pattern of results found by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) , and the fit of the model (compare Figures 1 and  5) is excellent. Thus, our single-system model can reproduce the functional dissociation between the two tasks. Note that the priming and recognition scores were obtained testing the same 100 networks. All parameters in the model, including a and b in the logistic function, were exactly the same. There was only a single difference, namely the presentation of the stimuli in degraded form in the priming condition.
What is the reason for the different shapes of the priming and the recognition function? To answer this question, look at the measure of prediction accuracy, cos , that is used to compute dЈ recognition scores (undegraded input) and priming scores (degraded input). The top panel of Figure 6 shows the average cos values separately for studied and unstudied items (in all 100 simulations) for the undegraded input. As the learning rate rises from 0 to .1, average cos values for both studied and unstudied items go up. This increase occurs because with low learning rates the network becomes primarily sensitive to a feature shared by all test items, namely that strings terminate after the third letter. Even with low learning rates, however, the network produces higher cos values for studied than for unstudied items. This is because the network also becomes sensitive to features of individual training strings that are not shared by the unstudied strings, for example, certain first and last letters. This sensitivity to the specific features of the studied strings further increases as the learning rate is set to values higher than .1. As a result, cos for unstudied strings, which do not share these features, declines. Despite the increase in sensitivity, however, cos for studied items only remains steady and with learning rates higher than .2 even goes down slightly. This can be explained as follows: With high learning rates, the network builds increasingly reliable representations, but these pertain to a decreasing number of strings, particularly to those in the second half of the training set. This is due to interference: The more the weights are changed on each trial, the more likely it is that previously stored information is overwritten. It is important to note, however, that because recognition performance depends on cos for both studied and unstudied items, interference does not reduce recognition performance. Rather, recognition performance increases because of the greater decrease of cos for unstudied items. Now, look at the average cos values for the degraded input (priming) in the bottom panel of Figure 6 . Cos increases for both types of items up to a learning rate of .15 and then decreases again. Cos for studied items is always higher than for unstudied items, but-contrary to what happens with undegraded input-this difference stays rather constant across a wide range of learning rates. Because the priming score depends on cos for studied as compared with unstudied items, the priming function is flat, as shown Figure 4 . Simulated recognition performance (dЈ; top) and simulated priming in percent (bottom) as a function of the learning rate using the stimulus materials of Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . Error bars indicate standard errors. Figure 5 . The figure shows the recognition dЈ score (left) and the priming score (right) after training the simple recurrent network with a high (.60) or a low (.15) learning rate using the stimulus materials of Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . Error bars indicate standard errors.
in Figure 4 .
2 The decrease for both studied and unstudied items arises because the network, becoming increasingly sensitive to the training input, has a growing tendency to reject input that differs from it. This happens not only for unstudied but also for studied items because these are presented in degraded form whereas undegraded items were presented during training.
As can be seen from Figure 6 , the different shapes of the priming and recognition functions emerge because cos for studied items presented in undegraded form does not decrease the same way as for studied items presented in degraded form. This is because the networks' weights have been adjusted to maximize prediction accuracy (i.e., cos ) for the undegraded input rather than for the degraded input. In summary, the reason why the learning rate functions for recognition and priming are different is that in the first task networks are tested on the same input they have been trained on, whereas in the second task the input is slightly different from the training input. It is important to note that participants in a priming and recognition experiment face a similar situation: Whereas in the recognition task studied items are presented in the same form as during training, during perceptual identification they are presented very briefly, that is, in degraded form. Thus, as in the simulations, participants' memory contents have to be activated by degraded variants of what they have previously been trained on. If an associative mechanism is responsible for learning the letter strings, higher levels of learning efficiency will, therefore, lead to better recognition performance but not to higher priming scores.
Simulating Hits, False Alarms, and Identification Rates
We have shown that the single-system SRN model can reproduce the dissociation between priming and recognition scores found by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . Next, we look at the predictions of the SRN in more detail. First, we ask whether the model can also account for the identification rates in the perceptual identification procedure that were used to compute the participants' priming scores. The left panel of Figure 7 shows the identification rates that were obtained in Keane et al.'s priming task. The right panel shows the mean identification rates that were predicted with learning rates of .15 and .60 in the simulations described above. As can be seen, the simulation results rather closely resemble the empirical data. In the experiment, amnesic patients had higher identification rates than controls, and this is reproduced in the simulations. The bottom panel of Figure 6 makes clear why this happens: With a learning rate of .60, prediction accuracy for both old and new items is lower than with a learning rate of .15. As a result, when the same logistic function parameters are used in all simulations, predicted identification rates are higher with a low than with a high learning rate.
We further asked whether the model can also predict the hits (studied items endorsed) and false alarms (unstudied items endorsed) that were used to compute recognition dЈ (these were not reported by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, & McNealy, 1995) . The left panel of Figure 8 shows the empirical values for both the control and the amnesic group. When we used the same logistic function parameters as in the simulations presented above, the hit and false-alarm rates were lower than those obtained empirically. Thus, the model predicted a more conservative criterion than was shown by the participants.
Signal-detection accounts of recognition memory (e.g., Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) assume that the criterion for calling items old in a recognition test can be adjusted intentionally. In the recognition simulations, this criterion is captured by the b parameter in the logistic function (see above). To capture this basic assumption of signal-detection theory, we can allow for the possibility that b may be different in priming and recognition as well as in different groups of participants. We ran additional simulations in which we adjusted b in such a way that there was an optimum fit between simulated and empirical hit and false-alarm rates (according to a least-mean-square criterion, for the exact values of b, see the Appendix). As can be seen in Figure 8 , in these simulations, we were able to exactly reproduce the hit and false-alarm rates found in Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy's (1995) study. Thus, when b is freely chosen, our single-system model can account for the entire pattern of results found by Keane et al. It is important to note that when the same b values that were used here are used in the simulations presented in Figure 5 , the fit to the data (see Figure 1) or decreases response proportions for both studied and unstudied items and priming and recognition depend on the difference between these two proportions rather than on their absolute size. It must be noted, however, that if b is set to very high or very low values, response proportions for both studied and unstudied items would be close to 0 or 1, which of course would considerably reduce both priming and recognition performance.
Does the SRN Model Develop Modularity During Training?
We have demonstrated that a single-system connectionist model can produce a dissociation between two memory tasks. The term single system refers to the architecture of the model because it does not contain independent modules. It is possible, however, that although the model is not devised as a modular system, it nevertheless develops some degree of modularity during training. This would be the case, for example, if a subset of the units was particularly activated in simulated recognition whereas a different subset was particularly activated in simulated priming. Furthermore, the network might respond differently to studied versus unstudied items in recognition and priming. To test this, we plotted the average activation values of the hidden units during both tasks separately for studied and unstudied items. Figure 9 shows activation values of all 40 hidden units in 4 different simulations that were chosen at random from a total of 100 simulations (left: recognition; right: priming). The figure shows that mean activation values for studied and unstudied items differ only slightly from each other. Furthermore, activation values are generally higher in recognition than in priming. However, there are neither units that respond primarily in one task but not in the other nor units that respond differently to studied versus unstudied items in the two tasks. In the other simulations, which are not presented here for brevity, the same qualitative result emerged. In conclusion, the model does not exhibit modularity in any sense. Nevertheless, reducing the learning rate in the model from a high to a low value considerably reduces recognition performance while having no effect on priming.
Simulation Study 2: Correlation Between Priming and Recognition
It is often regarded as evidence for distinct memory systems if the correlation between the performance scores obtained in two different tasks is low or 0 (Ostergaard, 1992; Tulving, 1999) . Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) did not report these correlations, but we computed them on the basis of their data. In the amnesic group, the correlation between percentage priming and recognition dЈ was .22, whereas in the control group, it was Ϫ.03. When the data of both groups were collapsed, the correlation was .02 (df ϭ 22, p Ͼ .94). These very low correlations seem to support the idea that priming and recognition are mediated by different memory systems.
For correlating percent priming and recognition dЈ in our simulations, we tested all 100 networks that had been trained using a low learning rate (.15) and all 100 networks that had been trained using a high learning rate (.60). Each of these networks was tested both on priming and recognition. As in Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy's (1995) experiment, we used different sets of test items for the priming and recognition tests. Specifically, we used one subset of the original test items (the first, third, fifth, . . . items) to simulate recognition and the other subset (the second, fourth, sixth, . . . items) to simulate priming and vice versa. That way, we obtained two priming and recognition scores for each network and a total of 200 scores for each learning rate. The results were as follows: With a low learning rate, the correlation between percentage priming and recognition dЈ was .02; with a high learning rate, it was .18; and with both collapsed it was .02 (df ϭ 398, p Ͼ .68). Thus, although priming and recognition were based on the same memory system, the correlation between the two scores was very low and not significantly different from 0. This makes it clear that low or zero correlations between priming and recognition do not provide evidence for distinct memory systems. 
Simulation Study 3: The Impact of Occipital Brain
Lesions on Priming A particularly strong case for distinct memory systems seems to be the following finding: One group of patients is impaired on one memory task but performs normally on another, whereas a second group of patients, having a different type of brain lesion, shows the opposite pattern of results. Such a double dissociation has been reported between priming and recognition: Although amnesic patients often show intact priming with impaired recognition, 2 patients with occipital brain lesions, M.S. and L.H., were shown to perform normally on a recognition task while exhibiting no priming when tested on a perceptual identification procedure Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, et al., 1995) . This finding was interpreted as evidence for a separate visuoperceptual nondeclarative memory system that is impaired in these patients. The finding is a challenge to the SRN model: When its learning mechanism is impaired by reducing the learning rate, recognition performance decreases while priming stays intact. There is no way to obtain the opposite pattern by making the learning mechanism less effective.
However, Kinder and Shanks (2001) suggested that M.S. and L.H.'s priming deficit might be due to a visual processing deficit rather than due to a nondeclarative memory deficit. At least in the case of L.H., such a deficit is apparent as his identification times are considerably longer than those of controls (Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, et al., 1995) . By contrast, M.S. showed normal identification performance for unstudied items Gabrieli et al., 1995) . Data reported by Fleischman et al. (1995) nevertheless cast doubt on the view that M.S.'s priming deficit truly is due to an impairment of visuoperceptual implicit memory. In that case, one would expect his deficit to appear after all types of training in which items are presented visually but not after training without visual presentation. By contrast, if his priming deficit results from a perceptual deficit rather than a memory deficit, one would expect it to occur on tasks involving visual processing whether or not the training stimuli were presented visually. Fleischman et al. tested M.S. and controls on a perceptual identification task after different types of training. In one experiment, he and the controls did not see the training stimuli but generated them (orally) from a definition. In terms of multiplesystems views of memory, this training should lead to conceptual rather than perceptual implicit memory (because no visual input was given). M.S., having no deficit of conceptual implicit memory, should acquire intact implicit knowledge on this task. After training, participants were tested on a perceptual identification task on which controls showed significant priming. By contrast, however, M.S. did not show any priming at all. Thus, M.S.'s priming deficit seems to be related to the testing task (the perceptual identification procedure) rather than to the type of training (perceptual vs. conceptual). This suggests that M.S. has a visual-processing deficit rather than a selective perceptual memory deficit.
In the simulations that are reported next, we tested whether the SRN predicts that priming is diminished or disappears when visual processing in the system is impaired. One problem in these simulations was that our model predicts identification rates, whereas in Gabrieli et al.'s (1995) experiment that revealed M.S.'s priming deficit, no identification rates were obtained. Rather, stimuli were presented for increasing durations until they were identified cor- rectly. Priming was then defined as the presentation duration required for studied items to be identified minus the presentation duration required for unstudied items to be identified. Simulating such a procedure would have called for extending our model in several respects and making various additional assumptions. Therefore, we decided to simulate a hypothetical experiment in which stimuli are presented for a fixed duration and identification rates are obtained to determine the amount of priming, rather than exactly reproducing Gabrieli et al.'s procedure.
A straightforward way to simulate a visual-processing deficit in the model is to increase the degree of degradation in the priming task. In Kinder and Shanks' (2001) simulations using Hamann and Squire's (1997b) stimulus materials, increasing the degradation strongly reduced the size of the priming effect. In the present simulations, we manipulated the degradation level using Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy's (1995) materials. We used four different levels of degradation (D): .1, .2, .3, and .4. Activation values were set to .9 Ϫ D and .1 ϩ D. The top panel of Figure 10 shows the priming effect as a function of the learning rate using these different levels of degradation. The more the input is degraded, the flatter is the priming function and the smaller is the average size of the priming effect. The curve obtained with a degradation level of .2 is the same as the priming curve in Figure 4 . This is the level of degradation that we used to simulate priming in amnesic and control participants. With degradation levels of .3 and .4, the priming effect is smaller across all learning rates. Now, assume that M.S. learns normally but has only a visual-processing deficit. We would then use a normal high learning rate (.6) to simulate his acquisition of knowledge about the strings but a higher than normal level of degradation (D ϭ .4) to simulate his performance in the perceptual identification test. With these parameters, the model predicts the size of the priming effect to be 0, as was actually observed in this patient using a perceptual identification procedure . At the same time, the model predicts recognition performance to be normal in M.S. because the input is not degraded when the recognition task is simulated. This resembles the experimental situation because during a recognition task stimuli are presented long enough to be identified without any problems. As Figure 11 shows, the singlesystem SRN model reproduces the double dissociation found by Gabrieli et al. (1995) when testing M.S., 2 amnesic patients, and controls, on the assumption that people with amnesia have impaired learning abilities but normal visual processing whereas M.S. has normal learning abilities but a deficit in visual processing.
In light of M.S.'s normal identification performance when presented with unstudied items, it is an interesting question how increasing the amount of degradation in the model affects identification performance. Identification rates predicted by the model using a learning rate of .6 and different levels of degradation are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 10 . Both for studied and unstudied items, identification rates decrease as the level of degradation increases. However, this decrease is considerably steeper for studied items than for unstudied ones. Thus, when comparing the identification rates for unstudied items at a normal level of degradation (.2) with those at a higher than normal one, the difference is smaller than would be expected when inspecting the priming difference. According to the model, a visual-processing deficit leading to a considerable decrease in priming has a much smaller effect on identification rates of unstudied items, consistent with the relatively normal pattern on unstudied items seen in M.S.
General Discussion
In the first part of this article, we reviewed evidence for the multiple-systems framework and we suggested that because much of the evidence is controversial (e.g., the process dissociation procedure and the use of remember and know judgments), a considerable burden of weight falls on neuropsychological studies in which declarative and nondeclarative memory have been dissociated. We then investigated whether a single-system connectionist model, the SRN model, can account for a dissociation between priming and recognition in amnesic participants that was reported by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . This experiment is prototypical of a number of other studies in that a clear-cut dissociation between priming in a perceptual identification task and recognition was found: Amnesic patients were impaired at recognition but showed completely normal priming. In our simulations, we assumed priming in perceptual identification and recognition to be based on a single memory process. We further assumed amnesia to be characterized by a general memory impairment, which we simulated by reducing the learning rate in the SRN Figure 10 . Top: Simulated priming in percent as a function of the learning rate using the stimulus materials of Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) . The different curves were obtained using different levels of degradation. Bottom: Simulated identification rates for studied and unstudied items at different levels of degradation. Error bars indicate standard errors. model on both tasks. When we trained and tested the model on Keane et al.'s stimuli, recognition performance deteriorated when the learning rate was reduced, whereas there was no reduction in priming. Thus, the model exactly reproduced Keane et al.'s findings. We also showed that the model accounted for fine-grained aspects of the data, for example, the hit and false-alarm rates. Although our results focus on a single piece of evidence in the large supporting case for the multiple-systems framework, we believe their implications are important because the data we simulated are representative of many published studies and because they come from an experimental procedure that is immune to many of the methodological concerns that have been rehearsed in the introduction and elsewhere (e.g., Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 1995) .
In a previous simulation study (Kinder & Shanks, 2001 ), we applied the SRN model to a further study with amnesic patients (Hamann & Squire, 1997b) . In this study, the same type of dissociation as in Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy's (1995) experiment was found: Amnesic patients showed impaired recognition but normal priming in a perceptual identification task. As in this article, we showed that the single-process SRN model could reproduce this dissociation without assuming a distinct memory system mediating priming. Because the SRN produces the same basic pattern with different stimulus materials, we can conclude that there is some generality to the finding that the model accounts for dissociations between priming in perceptual identification and recognition.
Although our model provides an excellent account of the dissociation between recognition and priming in amnesic patients by simply assuming that amnesic patients have a general learning deficit, it must be noted that we do not present a complete account of amnesia. Rather, the target of our article is a specific part of the amnesia literature-namely, the claim that amnesic patients provide evidence for the multiple memory systems view and specifically the declarative-nondeclarative distinction. Thus, we do not deal with phenomena such as impaired nonlinear discrimination learning and retrograde versus anterograde amnesia. However, we should mention a further dissociation found in amnesic patients that might be relevant to the issue of multiple memory systems: Some amnesic patients show preserved recognition performance, whereas they are impaired in free-recall tasks (e.g., Hanley et al., 2001) . One explanation of this result is that recall requires episodic memory whereas recognition can be done on the basis of familiarity, a process that might be selectively spared in some amnesic patients (Aggleton & Brown, 1999) . This dissociation is clearly beyond the scope of our model because it is incapable of simulating free recall. However, the basic assumption of a global learning deficit (i.e., a reduced learning rate) in amnesic patients might also hold for the dissociation between recall and recognition. Recall might be more sensitive to variations of the learning rate than recognition is. A small reduction of the learning rate (in patients who have only a mild memory deficit) might therefore affect recall while leaving recognition unaffected. Extending the model to deal with recall will allow this speculation to be tested.
One interpretation of the fact that recognition and recall may be dissociable is to suggest that recollection and familiarity processes contribute differentially to recognition and recall. The idea that these processes are independent has gained considerable currency in recent theorizing (see Yonelinas, 2002) . On this view, the main feature of amnesia is an impairment of recollection, with familiarity-and familiarity-based recognition-remaining relatively preserved. Recollection is assumed to be particularly important in situations in which recall is possible on the basis of a small number of exposures to an event (McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; Reber, 2002) . One could therefore extend the above line of reasoning by arguing that the recognition test used by Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy (1995) tended principally to evoke-both in normal and memory-impaired participantsfamiliarity-based memory judgments and that our simulation results hence say little about recollection. Specifically, on this account, our ability to simulate a dissociation between (familiaritybased) recognition and priming fails to establish that (recollectionbased) recall can be dissociated from priming.
The proposal that learning in Keane, Gabrieli, Noland, and McNealy's (1995) experiment is based on familiarity is, however, rather implausible. It has been shown that familiarity can only support learning when stimuli are familiar and unitized (such as words or faces) and not otherwise (Yonelinas, 2002) . The stimuli used by Keane et al., arbitrary consonant trigrams, plainly would not be expected to have this property. Indeed, Keane et al.'s stimuli were designed specifically to test the possibility that priming would be normal in amnesia with nonunitized stimuli lacking preexisting representations, for example, at the morphemic or syllabic level. Each of the consonants that constituted the test stimuli was equally familiar from the study phase; old and new stimuli could only be discriminated on the basis of conjunctions of letters not on the basis of the familiarity of the individual letters (i.e., the task is akin to associative recognition). Channon et al. (2002) have made a similar point with respect to artificial grammar learning that uses similar stimuli. Moreover, the claim that recognition and recall can be dissociated has been strongly challenged (Manns & Squire, 1999) , and it remains to be determined whether disproportionate impairments in recall compared with recognition may occur in amnesia. As discussed in the introduction, there are also alternative ways of explaining much of the data taken to support the recollection-familiarity distinction. Lastly, although we agree that recall based on only one or two exposures to an event is a particular hallmark of episodic memory, we do not see any particular reason to believe that models such as the SRN are unable to deal with one-trial learning, as argued by Reber (2002) . Feedforward models have been shown to be quite capable of avoiding the catastrophic forgetting problem often thought to be an intrinsic side effect when they are applied to one-trial learning situations (Robins, 1995) . When we tested our model after only two learning episodes-that is, after the actual amount of training that participants in Keane et al.'s experiment received-the model was able to reproduce the dЈ value of controls (when the other parameters in the model were adjusted accordingly). This shows that in our model using the present stimuli, catastrophic forgetting is not a big problem. Moreover, this version of the network continues to yield a dissociation between priming and recognition as learning rate is varied.
A particular challenge to our model seemed to be the data of 2 participants with occipital lesions that, together with the amnesic patients' data, constitute a double dissociation. Although these patients have normal recognition memory, they exhibit little or no priming. This was interpreted as evidence for a selective deficit of visual nondeclarative memory. In a further simulation study reported in this article, we have demonstrated that the single-system account can also explain this dissociation. It only has to be assumed that the patients have a visual-processing deficit rather than an impairment of nondeclarative visual memory. Thus, the singlesystem account also holds for a double dissociation between priming and recognition.
It could be objected, however, that to simulate this double dissociation, we had to manipulate more than a single parameter, that is, not only the learning rate but also the amount of visual degradation of the stimuli. However, it is essential to note that by manipulating two different parameters in the model, we do not assume a second memory system. To model the amnesic patients' data, we manipulated a parameter affecting learning, whereas to model the data of the occipital lobe patients, we manipulated a parameter related to visual input processing rather than to memory.
The dissociations reported in this article that were found in amnesic patients and patients with occipital lobe lesions seemed to have provided extremely convincing evidence for a separate nondeclarative memory system mediating priming in perceptual identification. By showing that a single learning mechanism can produce such dissociations as well, our work raises the possibility that priming in perceptual identification and recognition is based on the same memory process. A challenge to our model, however, seems to be the finding that some amnesic patients show intact priming together with at-chance recognition performance whereas controls' recognition performance is well above chance level. In an earlier study (Kinder & Shanks, 2001) , we showed that the SRN model can account even for that result. In that study, however, different item formats were used on the identification and recognition tasks, which adds an additional degree of freedom to the simulations. A more serious challenge is posed when the same pattern of results is found in an experiment in which the same item formats are used in perceptual identification and priming. To our knowledge, the only study in which this was true and in which an amnesic patient showed normal priming in a perceptual identification task in the complete absence of recognition was a study conducted by Hamann and Squire (1997a) . These authors tested E.P., a densely amnesic patient, both on recognition and perceptual identification of studied and unstudied items. Although E.P. was completely unable to recognize the study items, he showed the same amount of priming as his controls. However, the model might account even for this pattern, if b in the logistic function is different when simulating E.P.'s recognition and priming performance. Consider, for example, the possibility that E.P. rejected a high proportion of test items as new in recognition rather than calling approximately half of them old and half of them new. In terms of signal-detection theory, this would resemble a very conservative bias. To simulate this conservative bias, we would have to set b in the logistic function to a much higher value than is normally used, but this would only apply to recognition and not to priming. As noted before, recognition performance predicted by the model deteriorates with very high or low values of b. Whether E.P. exhibited an extremely conservative bias in recognition could be tested by looking at his hit and false-alarm rates, but unfortunately Hamann and Squire did not report these.
Another potential problem for our single-system view of priming in perceptual identification and recognition is the existence of dissociations in controls, showing that an experimental manipulation selectively affects either priming or recognition performance while not affecting the other measure of performance. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) , for example, found that manipulating the training conditions in certain ways affected recognition but had no effect on priming. In one of their experiments, they manipulated training task difficulty (reading vs. anagram solving) and found that recognition performance increased when the training task became more difficult whereas the priming effect remained constant. The same pattern of results was obtained in a second experiment in which the level of processing was manipulated: A deeper level of processing led to better recognition performance, whereas there was no effect on priming. How could we simulate varying difficulties of the training task or different levels of processing in our model? A simple way to achieve this would be to ignore the exact nature of these manipulations and to simply assume that learning proceeds faster with deeper levels of processing and a higher training-task difficulty. The most straightforward way to simulate differences in the speed of learning would be to vary the learning rate. As can be seen in the simulations presented in this article, varying the learning rate has a much larger effect on recognition performance than it has on the size of the priming effect. Thus, by varying the learning rate, our model could readily reproduce Jacoby and Dallas's findings.
A more serious challenge to our model is the finding that certain experimental manipulations selectively affect priming. A number of studies have shown, for example, that when modality of presentation is changed from study to test, priming is reduced considerably (for an overview, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) . By contrast, several studies showed no effect of modality change on recognition (e.g., Kirsner, Milech, & Standen, 1983) . However, this was not found consistently across studies: Jacoby and Dallas (1981) , for example, found that a modality change significantly reduced both priming and recognition. Even in this experiment, however, priming was affected much more than recognition. In the simple version of our model that is presented in this article, the representations of letters in the input layer are not specific to a particular modality. Therefore, effects of shifting modality are beyond the scope of our model. However, by adding additional layers that represent input from different modalities, we could extend the model to simulate modality effects. In this extended model, shifting modality of presentation would affect priming but not recognition if it is assumed that priming depends primarily on modality-specific representations whereas recognition depends to a larger extent on modality-unspecific representations. This would be the case, for example, if the modality-specific representations are the ones that are activated first, thus being involved already at the very short presentation durations that are used in perceptual identification tests.
Further evidence that priming in perceptual identification is based on a different memory system than recognition could emerge in the future from brain-imaging studies. In one published study, Jernigan et al. (1998) measured brain activity during recognition and perceptual identification of old and new items using positron emission tomography. They found that different brain regions were activated during the two tasks, but this finding can be attributed to numerous procedural differences between the two tasks, and as Jernigan et al. themselves conceded, their results were inconclusive about whether priming and recognition depend on distinct neural systems. The distinct memory systems view would be strengthened only if blood flow increase or decrease resulting from repetition (studied vs. unstudied items) was occurring in different brain regions in priming and recognition. As far as we are aware, there are no studies that investigated priming in perceptual identification showing this pattern of results.
Other Computational and Mathematical Accounts of Dissociations
Computational models and mathematical accounts of memory can be divided into two different classes as to whether they assume distinct memory systems. Dual-system models typically explain dissociations between declarative and nondeclarative tasks by distinguishing between the hippocampal and the cortical system. According to McClelland et al. (1995) , the cortical system resembles a connectionist network, learning slowly and through a large number of repetitions, whereas the hippocampal system is able to acquire new information after only a single presentation. Information is transferred from the hippocampal to the cortical system by the former acting as a "teacher" for the latter. O'Reilly and Rudy (2000, 2001 ) also proposed different learning modes within the hippocampal and the cortical system. According to these authors, the cortical system is characterized by slow learning and overlapping, distributed representations. By contrast, learning in the hippocampal system is thought to be fast, and nonoverlapping representations are used to avoid catastrophic interference that otherwise would be a consequence of rapid learning. Also, Gluck and Myers (1993) assumed different roles of the hippocampal and the cortical system. According to their model, the hippocampal system forms stimulus representations that in turn can be incorporated into cortical networks.
In contrast to the assumptions of these models, other researchers have shown that functional dissociations between cognitive tasks can also be reproduced by single-system models. McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) simulated amnesia in a simple delta rule network by reducing the learning rate. Test stimuli either were identical to the training stimuli or were new instances of the same category. Reducing the learning rate had a considerable impact when the test and training stimuli were identical, whereas the impact was small when they were different. This is rather similar to what we found in our simulations in which testing and training stimuli also were either identical or differed because of different presentation durations in training and test. Thus, our findings are not specific to recurrent networks but seem to reflect a more general phenomenon in connectionist models: If training and test stimuli differ, the learning rate has much less of an impact on performance than it has if training and test stimuli are identical.
We have already mentioned the work of Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) , who demonstrated that the GCM, a single-system exemplar model of categorization and recognition, can account for a dissociation between recognition and implicit categorization in amnesia. We also referred to our own work (Kinder & Shanks, 2001 ) in which we made a similar demonstration in artificial grammar learning using the SRN model: When we simulated amnesia by reducing the learning rate, we were able to reproduce dissociations found by Knowlton and colleagues (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994 , 1996 between categorizing and recognizing strings or substrings.
In the same vein, Poldrack, Selco, Field, and Cohen (1998) showed that single-system models can account for dissociations between two indirect measures of memory, repetition priming and skill learning. Two findings were interpreted as evidence for these being based on different systems: First, in several studies, no correlations between priming and skill learning were observed, and second, differing relationships between skill learning and priming were found across training. Two models, an extension of Logan's (1988) instance model and a three-layered backpropagation model, were tested on their ability to account for these results. Both models were able to reproduce each of the patterns of results previously thought to indicate separate skill-learning and priming mechanisms.
There are further examples of single-system accounts of functional dissociations in patients with brain lesions, apart from those in memory and learning research. Plaut (1995) cited studies testing 2 patients with lesions in the left temporal lobe, both of whom were impaired at pronouncing words. One of them had more difficulties in pronouncing abstract than concrete words whereas the other patient showed the opposite pattern of results. This double dissociation was interpreted as evidence for abstract and concrete words being represented separately in the brain. Plaut (1995) , however, showed that a single-system model of word reading produced exactly this pattern of results when different types of connections in the model were lesioned. Phaf, Mul, and Wolters (1994) proposed a single-system model dealing with dissociation between implicit and explicit processes in normal participants. Their model incorporates the activationelaboration hypotheses of Mandler (1979) , according to which implicit memory is based on activation learning (i.e., strengthening of existing memory representations) whereas explicit memory is based on elaboration (i.e., building of new associations). The model proposed by Phaf et al. is implemented in a modular framework with both activation and elaboration taking place in each module. The two processes resemble a continuum rather than a dichotomy and thus are not separated from each other.
Conclusion
Although researchers using computational modeling have been pointing out for some time the risks of using dissociations to draw inferences about cognitive architecture, memory researchers continue to use dissociations as their primary evidence for multiple memory systems (e.g., Tulving, 1999) . For instance, Roediger, Buckner, and McDermott (1999) in a review of the memory systems debate recently wrote "The only critical point for the remaining exposition is that any two tasks that are dissociated must have at least one component process that differs between them" (p. 52), a claim that has been falsified by numerous connectionist simulations including the ones we have presented here. It is simply not the case in our model that an increase in learning rate-which has an effect on recognition but not on priming (see Figure  5 )-leads to the recruitment of an additional component process in the former. The richly interactive processing that can be observed in simple distributed connectionist models represents a challenge to current multiple-systems theories of memory.
